Abstract. We develop cryptographically secure techniques to guarantee unconditional privacy for respondents to polls. Our constructions are efficient and practical, and are shown not to allow cheating respondents to affect the "tally" by more than their own vote -which will be given the exact same weight as that of other respondents. We demonstrate solutions to this problem based on both traditional cryptographic techniques and quantum cryptography.
Introduction
In some instances, privacy is a matter of keeping purchase information away from telemarketers, competitors, or other intruders. In other instances, privacy translates to security against traffic analysis, such as for web browsing; or to security of personal location information. In still other instances, which we study in this paper, privacy is a precondition to being able to obtain answers to important questions. Two concrete examples of instances of latter are elections and surveys/polls.
While the first of these examples is the one of the two that has received -by far -the most attention in the field of cryptography, there are important reasons to develop better privacy tools for polling. Surprisingly, the two examples (namely, elections and polls), while quite similar at a first sight, are very different in their requirements. Since it is typically the case that there is more funding available for providing privacy in elections than in surveys and polls, it follows that the tallying process in the former may involve more costly steps than that in the latter -whether the process is electronic (using, e.g., mix networks) or mechanic. Second, while in the case of the voting scheme, we have that users need to entrust their privacy with some set of authorities, it is often the case that there is less trust established between the parties in polls. Yet another reason to treat the two situations separately is that elections involve many more respondents than polls typically do, thereby allowing a unique opinion (e.g., vote) to be hidden among many more in the case of elections than in the case of polls. Finally, while elections require as exact tallying as is possible, statistical truths are both sufficient and desirable in polls. This allows the use of polling techniques that are very different from election techniques -in terms of their cost; how tallying is done; and how privacy is protected.
While not given much attention in cryptography, important work on polling has been done in statistics. In particular, the randomized response technique (RRT) was proposed by Warner [War65] in 1965, with the goal of being used in polls relating to sensitive issues, such as drug abuse, sexual preferences and shoplifting. The underlying idea behind Warner's proposal is for respondents to randomize each response according to a certain, and known, probability distribution. More precisely, they answer the question truthfully with some probability p ct > 1/2, while with a fixed and known probability 1 − p ct they lie. Thus, users can always claim that their answer -if it is of the "incriminating" type -was a lie. When evaluating all the answers of the poll, these lies become statistically insignificant given a large enough sample (where the size of the sample can be simply computed from the probability distribution governing lying.)
However, a pure RRT by itself is not well suited for all types of polls. E.g., it is believed that people are more likely to vote for somebody who leads the polls than somebody who is behind. Therefore, it could be politically valuable not to lie (as required by the protocol) in polls relating to ones political opinion, and therefore have one's "vote" assigned a greater weight. (This is the case since people with the opposite opinion -if honestly following the protocol -will sometimes cast a vote according to your opinion, but you would never cast a vote according to their opinion, assuming you are willing to cheat.) While the results of the poll remain meaningful if everybody cheats (i.e., tells the truth with a probability different from that specified by the protocol), this is not the case when only some people deviate from the desired behavior. Also, while one might say that the increased weight in the polls is gained at the price of the cheater's privacy, this is not necessarily the case if the cheater claims to have followed the protocol, and there is no evidence to the contrary.
To address the problem of cheating respondents in RRT, we propose the notion of cryptographic randomized response technique (CRRT), which is a modification of RRT that prevents cheating. We present three efficient protocols for CRRT; two of them using classic cryptographic methods (and being efficient for different values of p ct ), and one using quantum methods. Importantly, the quantum RRT protocol is implementable by using contemporary technology. We give rigorous proofs of security for one of the classical protocols and for the quantum protocol.
For all of our proposed solutions, the privacy of the respondent will be guaranteed information-theoretically (more precisely, statistically). This is appropriate to stimulate truthful feedback on topics that may affect the respondent for years, if not decades. All proposed solutions also guarantee that the respondents reply based on the desired probability distributions. Clearly, this requires that the respondent cannot determine the outcome of the protocol (as viewed by the interviewer) before the end of the protocol. Otherwise, he could simply halt the execution of the protocol to suppress answers in which the communicated opinion was a lie. We will therefore require protocols to offer privacy for the interviewer as well as for the respondent, meaning that the respondent cannot learn what the outcome of the protocol is, as seen by the interviewer. (One could relax this requirement slightly to allow the respondent to learn the outcome at the same time as the interviewer does, or afterward.)
While we believe that it is important to prevent the respondent from biasing the outcome by selective halting (corresponding to the protocol being strongly secure), we also describe simplified versions of our protocols in which this protection mechanism is not available. Such simplified versions (which we refer to as weakly secure) can still be useful in some situations. They may, for example, be used as the default scheme for a given application -where they would be replaced by their strongly secure relatives if too many interactions are halted prematurely. (The decision of when the shift would be performed should be based on standard statistical methods, and will not be covered herein.) The benefit of considering such dual modes is that the weakly secure versions typically are computationally less demanding than the strongly secure versions.
Finally, we also discuss cryptographic enhancements to two alternative RRT techniques. In the first, referred to as RRT-IQ, the respondent always gives the truthful answer to the question he is presented with. However, with a certain probability, he is presented with an Innocous Question instead of the intended question. A second alternative RRT technique is what is referred to as polychotomous RRT. In this version of RRT, the respondent is given more than two possible options per question.
In particular, our first protocol uses a novel protocol for information-theoretically secure verifiable oblivious transfer that enables easier zero-knowledge proofs on the properties of the transferred values. The described protocol may also be useful in other applications. We also note that our techniques have applications in the privacypreserving data-mining, see Section 3.
Outline. We first review the details of the randomized response technique (Section 2), after which we review some related work in cryptography (Section 3). We then introduce the cryptographic building blocks of our protocols (Section 4). We then describe the functionality of our desired solution in terms of functional black boxes and protocol requirements (Section 5). In Section 6, we present our secure CRRT protocols. In Section 7 we describe cryptographic solutions to other variants of the standard RRT. The appendix contains additional information about the new oblivious transfer protocol and about the quantum RRT protocol.
Short Review of Randomized Response Technique
When polling on sensitive issues like sexual behavior or tax evasion, respondents often deny their stigmatizing behavior due to the natural concern about their privacy. In 1965, Warner [War65] proposed the Randomized Response Technique (RRT) for organization of polls where an unbiased estimator (UE) to the summatory information -the proportion of people belonging to a stigmatizing group A -can be recovered, while the privacy of every individual respondent is protected statistically. Since then, different variations of the RRT have been proposed in statistics, see [CM88] for a survey. These different variations provide, for example, smaller variance, smaller privacy breaches, optimality under different definitions of privacy, and ability to answer polychotomous questions. Next we will give a short overview of three types of RRT.
RRT-W. In Wagner's original method (RRT-W), the respondents provide a truthful answer to the question "Do you belong to a stigmatizing group A?" with a certain fixed and publicly known probability p ct > 1/2. With probability 1 − p ct they liei.e., answer the opposite question. Define π A to be the true proportion of the population that belongs to A (or whose type is t = 1). Let p yes be the proportion of "yes" responses in the poll. Clearly, in RRT-W the a priori probability of getting a "yes" response is p yes = p ct · π A + (1 − p ct )(1 − π A ). In the case of N players, L of which answer "yes", an UE of p yes is p yes = L/N , the sample proportion of "yes" answers. From this, one can simply compute the unbiased estimator of π A . This equals
. Similarly, the variance var( π A ) and its UE can be computed.
RRT-IQ.
An alternative RRT is the innocuous question method (RRT-IQ), first analyzed in [GASH69] . When using RRT-IQ, the respondent answers the sensitive question with a probability p ct , while with probability 1 − p ct to an unrelated and innocuous question, such as "Flip a coin. Did you get tails?". The RRT-IQ achieves the same goals as RRT-W but with less variance [CM88] , which makes it more suitable for practical polling. Many other RRT-IQs are known, including some with unknown estimate of the the proportion of the population belonging to the innocuous group.
PRRT. The RRTs for dichotomous polling (where the answer is yes or no) can be generalized to polychotomous RRT (PRRT) where the respondent can belong to one of the m mutually exclusive groups A 1 , . . . , A m , some of which are stigmatizing. A typical sensitive question of this kind is "When did you have your first child?", with answers "1 -while not married", "2 -within 9 months after the wedding" and "3 -more than 9 months after the wedding". In many cultures, the answer 1 is stigmatizing, the answer 3 is innocuous, while the answer 2 is somewhere inbetween. The interviewer wants to know an UE for the proportion π i of people who belong to the group 
Related Cryptographic Work.
In [KANG99] , Kikuchi et al. propose techniques with similar goals as ours. Seemingly unaware of the previous work on RRT, the authors reinvent this notion, and propose a protocol for performing the data exchange. However, their protocol is considerably less efficient than ours. Also, it does not offer strong security in our sense. This vulnerability to cheating makes their protocol unsuitable for their main application (voting), as well as polls where respondents may wish to bias their answer. Our protocols can be used in their framework.
Our work has a relation to work on biased coin flipping, where heads must come out with probability p ct = ℓ/n. In our case, the coin can be biased by the first participant in several ways, where the choice of the distribution encodes the opinion of the respondent to the poll. More concretely, consider a coin where one outcome (say, 1) corresponds to "yes", and the other (0) to "no". Let us assume that the respondent should give his correct opinion with 75% probability. Then, if his opinion is "yes", the coin will have bias 0.75, while it will have bias 0.25 if his opinion is "no". However, our technique is not merely a generalization of biased coin flipping, as we also want our protocols to implement privacy. This is an issue that is not important in the context of ordinary biased coin flipping.
In order to guarantee that responses are made according to the intended distribution, we introduce a "blinding" requirement: we need our protocols to be constructed such that they do not leak the response to the respondent -at least not until the response has been delivered to the interviewer. From a bird's eye's view, this makes our protocols similar to those in [JY96] , in which a party proves either language membership or language non-membership to a verifier, but without being able to determine which one. However, the similarities between our protocols and those in [JY96] do not run much deeper than that.
In contrast, there is a much closer relationship between our protocols and protocols for oblivious transfer [Rab81, EGL85] . While our goals are orthogonal to those of oblivious transfer, the techniques are hauntingly similar. In particular, one of our CRRT protocols uses a protocol for oblivious transfer as a building block. While in principle any such protocol can be used, it is clear that the properties of the building block will be inherited by the main protocol. Therefore, in order to provide unconditional guarantees of privacy for the respondents, we use a verifiable variant of the information theoretic protocol for oblivious transfer, namely that proposed by Naor and Pinkas [NP01b] . (An efficient protocol that offers computational security for the sender was proposed by Tzeng [Tze02] .)
Cryptographic randomized response techniques are also related to oblivious function evaluation [Gol02] , where one party has data µ, while another party needs to compute f (µ), without getting to know any additional information on µ, while the first party will not get to know f . Cryptographic RRTs can be seen as protocols for oblivious function evaluation of some specific randomized functions f . Furthermore, our work is related to the work on Private Information Retrieval (PIR) -and even to privacy-preserving data-mining -in that the goal of our interviewer is to retrieve some element from the respondent, without the latter learning what was retrieved. More specifically, if some ℓ out of n elements represent the respondent's opinion, and the remaining n − ℓ elements represent the opposite opinion, then the interviewer will learn the respondent's opinion with probability ℓ/n if he retrieves a random element. Of course, in order to guarantee the interviewer that the elements are correctly formed, additional mechanisms are required.
In privacy-preserving data-mining a related data randomization approach has been proposed [AS00]: namely, the users input their data to the central database (e.g., a loyal customer inputs the name of the product he bought), and the database maintainer needs to do some statistical analysis on the database. However, the maintainer should not be able to recover individual items. Database randomization in the case when the maintainer is limited to the SUM function corresponds exactly to the RRT. For the same reasons as in the RRT, one should not be able to bias the data. Our protocols are also applicable in the privacy-preserving data-mining and hopefully even in the case when more elaborated randomizations [ESAG02] are applied.
Cryptographic Building Blocks
Assume that p is a large prime, and q, q | (p−1), is another prime. Then Z p has a unique subgroup G of order q. Let g and h be two generators of G, such that nobody knows their mutual discrete logarithms log g h and log h g. We let k be the security parameter, in our setting we can take k = q. The key K consists of public parameters, K := (g; h).
Pedersen's Commitment Scheme. In this scheme [Ped91] , a message µ ∈ Z q is committed by drawing a random ρ ← R Z q , and setting C K (µ; ρ) := g µ h ρ . The commitment can be opened by sending µ and ρ to the verifier. This scheme is homomorphic,
Since it is also perfectly hiding and computationally binding, it can be used as a building block in efficient zero-knowledge arguments, such as protocols for arguing the knowledge of plaintext µ.
Variant of Naor-Pinkas 1-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer. The oblivious transfer (OT) protocol by Naor and Pinkas [NP01b] guarantees information-theoretic privacy for the sender R, and computational privacy for the chooser I. Assume the sender R has a vector µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) ∈ M n for some set M ⊆ Z q . The chooser I has made a choice σ ∈ [1, n]. The Naor-Pinkas protocol works as follows:
si as the key. Send (w i , y i ) to I. 3. I computes w b σ (= v σ ) and decrypts y σ using v σ as the key, obtaining µ σ .
(Both R and I halt if any received transcript is not correctly formatted.) Note that
, while for i = σ, v i is a random element of G. Thus, in the third step R recovers v σ , while obtaining no information about v i for i = σ.
The Naor and Pinkas [NP01b] paper does not specify the encryption method, mentioning only that the encryption scheme must be semantically secure. We propose to use Pedersen's commitment scheme instead of an encryption scheme. Herein, we use K = (g; h) as the parameters of the commitment scheme, and use v i instead of r i as the random coin, producing a commitment y i := C K (µ i ; v i ). We denote this version of Naor-Pinkas protocol, where y i is defined as
The idea behind this unconventional trick is that as the result, the sender can argue in zero-knowledge for all i ∈ [1, n] that the values µ i satisfy some required conditions. (We call such an OT protocol verifiable.) The chooser cannot decrypt y i without knowing v i , and thus he cannot guess the value of µ i for i = σ (with probability higher than |M | 2 /q, as we will show in Appendix A), even if he knows that µ i is chosen from a fixed two-element set. (This constitutes the security of OT protocol in the left-or-right sense. See Appendix A.) On the other hand, I can "decrypt" y σ with the "key" v σ , given that the possible message space M is small enough for the exhaustive search on the set {g x : x ∈ M } to be practical. In the case of dichotomous RRT, M = {0, 1}.
Noninteractive Zero-Knowledge Arguments. We will use zero-knowledge arguments (and not proofs) of knowledge in our protocol, since they are (at the very least) statistically hiding and computationally convincing. This property is important in a setting where a verifier must not be able to extract additional information even if he is given infinite time.
Our first protocol uses only two very standard statistical zero-knowledge arguments. (The arguments for the second protocol are described in appendices.) The first one is an argument that a given value y i (Pedersen-)commits to a Boolean value µ i ∈ {0, 1}. One can use standard disjunctive proofs [CDS94] for this. We denote the (possibly parallelized) argument that this holds for i ∈ [1, n] by AKEncBool(y 1 , . . . , y n ). The second argument of knowledge, AKLin(y 1 , . . . , y n+1 ; a, b), is an argument that the prover knows some set of values µ i , for which y i is a commitment of µ i , and such that i≤n µ i + aµ n+1 = b. This argument of knowledge can be constructed from Pedersen's commitment scheme by computing y ← i≤n y i · y a n+1 and then arguing that the result y is a commitment to b. Note that such an argument of knowledge is secure only when accompanied by zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge of the values µ i ; for this purpose, we employ AKEncBool(y 1 , . . . , y n+1 ) as described above.
Security Definitions
In this section, we will give the definition of a weakly and strongly secure cryptographic RRT (CRRT). The security definitions will be in accordance with the ones in secure two-party computation [Gol02] . We will also explain why these requirements are relevant in the case of CRRT.
Assume we have a concrete variant of RRT, like RRT-W or RRT-IQ. Let Φ p be the function that implements the desired functionality. For example, in the case of RRT-W, Φ pct (x) is a randomized function that with probability p ct returns x, and with probability 1 − p ct returns 1 − x. The ideal-world CRRT protocol, has three parties, the interviewer I, the respondent R, and the trusted third party T . R has her type, t R as her private input, while I has no private input. Then, R communicates t R to T , who selects the value r R ← Φ pct (t R ) and sends r R to I. After that, the private output of I will be Φ pct (t R ), while R will have no private output. It is required that at the end of the protocol, the participants will have no information about the private inputs and outputs of their partners, except for what can be deduced from their own private inputs and outputs. In particular, I (resp. R) has no information about the value of t R (resp. r R ), except what they can deduce from their private inputs and outputs.
In an ideal world, exactly the next three types of attacks are possible [Gol02, Section 2.1.2]: a party can (a) refuse to participate in the protocol; (b) substitute his private input to the trusted third party with a different value; or (c) abort the protocol prematurely. In our case, the attack (c) is irrelevant, since R has no output. (Attack (c) models the case when the first party halts the protocol after receiving his private output but before the second party has enough information to compute her output.) Therefore, in an ideal-world RRT protocol, we cannot protect against a participant, who (a) refuses to participate in polling (non-participation attack) or (b) claims that her type is 1 − t R , where t R is her real type (absolute denial attack). No other attacks should be possible. Note that neither (a) nor (b) is traditionally considered an attack in the context of polling or voting. The argument here is game-theoretic, and the solutions must be proposed by mechanism design, instead of cryptography: namely, a non-manipulable mechanism (e.g., the algorithm with which the election winner is determined from all the collected votes) must be designed so that answering against one's true type (or non-participation) would not give more beneficial results to the respondent than the truthful answer.
On the other hand, as we stated, no other attacks should be allowed. This requirement is very strict, so we will explain why it is necessary in the RRT's context. Clearly, one must protect the privacy of R, since this is the primarily goal of a RRT. It is also necessary to protect the privacy of I, although the reason here is more subtle. Namely, if R obtains any additional information about r R before the end of the protocol (for example, if she suspects that r R = t R ), she might halt the protocol. Such a behavior by a malicious respondent might cause a bias in the poll, as already explained. (Halting the protocol while having no information on r R is equivalent to the non-participation attack.) The third requirement on the protocol, of course, is that I either halts or receives Φ pct (x), where x is the input submitted by the R.
In a real-world implementation, we want to replace T by a cryptographic protocol Π = (R, I) between R and I. This protocol (R, I) is assumed to be "indistinguishable" from the ideal-world protocol, that is, with a high probability, it should be secure against all attacks that do not involve attacks (a) or (b). "Secure" means that the privacy of R (resp. I) must be protected, if R (resp. I) follows the protocol, and that I either halts, or receives the value Φ pct (x), where x was the submitted value of R. The security of the respondent should be information-theoretical, while the security of interviewer can be computational. That is, a secure CRRT-W protocol must have the next three properties (here, k is the security parameter):
Privacy of Respondent: Let I * be an algorithm. After the end of the protocol execution (R, I * ), I * will have no more information on t R than it would have had after the execution of the ideal world protocol. That is, assuming that view I * is his view of the protocol (R, I * ), define
where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of I * and R. We say that a CRRT protocol is privacy-preserving for the respondent, if Adv
* ) is negligible (in k) for any unbounded adversary I * .
Privacy of Interviewer:
Let R * be an algorithm. Assume that I halts when R * halts. After the end of the protocol execution (R * , I), R * will have no more information on t R than it would have had after the execution of the ideal world protocol. That is, assuming that view R * is her view of the protocol (I, R * ), define
where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of R * and I. We say that a CRRT protocol is privacy-preserving for the interviewer, if for any adversary R * , if Adv pri−i k (R * , I) ≤ ε and R * takes τ steps of computation then ετ is negligible (in k).
Correctness: Let R * (x) be an algorithm with private input x to the protocol (R * , I). Assume that I halts when R * halts. We require that at the end of the protocol execution (R * , I), I will either halt, or otherwise receive Φ pct (x) with high probability. That is, assuming that view I is I's view of the protocol (R * , I), define
where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of I and R * . We say that a CRRT protocol is correct, if for any adversary R * , if Adv crct I (R * ) = ε and R * takes up to t steps of computation then ετ is negligible (in k).
We call a cryptographic RRT (CRRT) protocol weakly secure if it is privacypreserving for the respondent and correct. We call CRRT protocol (strongly) secure if it is weakly secure and it is privacy-preserving for the interviewer. While a secure CRRT protocol is preferable in many situations, there are settings where a weakly secure CRRT protocol suffices, such as where halting can be easily detected and punished, or means for state recovery prevent modifications between a first and second attempt of executing the protocol.
Cryptographic RRT
We will propose three different CRRT-W protocols. In the first two protocols, the common parameters are p ct = ℓ/n > 1/2; generators g and h whose mutual discrete logs are unknown (at least by R); and K = (g; h). R has private input t = t R , and I's private output is r R .
CRRT Protocol Based on Oblivious Transfer. Our first implementation of RRT-W is described in Protocol 1. The arguments of knowledge can be efficiently constructed, see Sect. 4. Here, we can use AKLin(y 1 , . . . , y n+1 ; 2ℓ − n; ℓ) since i≤n µ i + (2ℓ − n)µ n+1 = ℓ independently of the value of t. All the steps in this protocol must be authenticated.
PRECOMPUTATION STEP: 1. R prepares n random bits µi ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ [1, n], such that µi = ℓ if t = 1 and µi = n − ℓ if t = 0. Additionally, she sets µn+1 ← 1 − t. 2. I chooses an index σ ∈ [1, n]. INTERACTIVE STEP:
1. I and R follow 1 n -OTK (g µ 1 , . . . , g µn ; σ). I obtains g µσ , and computes µσ from that. 2. R sends to I noninteractive zero-knowledge arguments AKEncBool(y1, . . . , yn+1), and AKLin(y1, . . . , yn+1; 2ℓ − n; ℓ). 3. I verifies the arguments, and halts if the verification fails.
Protocol 1: A secure CRRT-W protocol based on oblivious transfer
If we take the number of bits that must be committed as the efficiency measure (communication complexity of the protocol), then our protocol has complexity O(n).
In the polling application, one can most probably assume that n ≤ 5. The security proofs of this protocol follow directly from the properties of underlying primitives. As a direct corollary from Theorem 2, we get that Protocol 1 is privacy-preserving for respondent (Adv pri−r k (R, I * ) ≤ 2/q + O(1/q), where the constant comes in from the use of statistically-hiding zero-knowledge arguments). It is privacy preserving for interviewer, given the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. The correctness of this protocol follows from the properties of the zero-knowledge arguments used under the DDH assumption.
In a simplified weakly secure protocol based on the same idea, R commits to all µ i by computing and publishing y i ← C K (µ i ; ρ i ). Next, R argues that AKEncBool(y 1 , . . . , y n+1 ), and AKLin(y 1 , . . . , y n+1 ; 2ℓ − n; ℓ). After that, I sends σ to R, who then reveals µ σ and ρ σ . Upon obtaining these, I verifies the correctness of the previous corresponding commitment, outputting µ σ .
CRRT from Coin-Flipping. Protocol 2 depicts a secure CRRT-W protocol with communication complexity Θ(d log 2 n), where d := ⌈1/(1 − p ct )⌉, and p ct = ℓ/n as previously. While in the common RRT application one can usually assume that n is relatively small, this second protocol is useful in some specific game-theoretic applications where for the best outcome, p ct must have a very specific value. The idea behind this protocol is that at least one of the integers µ + ν + iℓ mod n must be in interval [0, ℓ − 1], and at least one of them must be in interval [ℓ, n − 1]. Hence, I gets necessary proofs for both the 0 and the 1 answer, which is sufficient for his goal. For his choice to be accepted, he must accompany the corresponding r with R-s signature on his commitment on σ. 1. R commits to t and µ, and sends the commitments to I. 2. I commits to σ, by setting y ← CK(σ; ρ) for some random ρ. He sends ν and y to R, together with a zero-knowledge argument that y is a commitment of some i ∈ [0, d − 1]. Protocol 2: A secure CRRT-W protocol based on coin-flipping A weakly secure version of this protocol is especially efficient. There, one should set d ← 1, and omit the steps in Protocol 2 that depend on σ being greater than 1. (E.g., there is no need to commit to σ anymore.) Thus, such a protocol would have communication complexity Θ(log 2 n). Now, p ct > 1/2 (otherwise one could just do a bit-flip on the answers), and hence d > 2. On the other hand, the privacy of respondents 
R verifies the argument. She computes values µ
2. R chooses a random i ←R [0, 1]. INTERACTIVE STEP: 1. I sends |ψ0 and |ψ1 to R. 2. R sends i to I. 3. I sends ui to R.
R measures the state |ψi in the basis |ψu
√ pct|1 − ui and halts if the result is not |ψu i .
5. If the verification is passed, R performs the transformation |0 → |t , |1 → |1 − t on the state |ψ1−i and sends it back to I. 6. I measures the state in the basis |0 , |1 , gets outcome s. I outputs r ← ui ⊕ s.
Protocol 3:
A quantum CRRT-W protocol.
is in danger if say p ct ≥ 3/4. Thus, we may assume that d ∈ [3, 4]. Therefore, Protocol 2 will be more communication-efficient than Protocol 1 as soon as n/ log 2 n > 4 ≥ d, or n ≥ 16. The weakly secure version will be always more communication-efficient.
This protocol is especially efficient if the used commitment scheme is an integer commitment scheme [FO99, DF02] . In this case, to argue that (µ + ν + iℓ mod n) < ℓ one only must do the next two simple steps: first, argue that µ + ν + iℓ = z + en for some z, e, and then, argue that z ∈ [0, ℓ − 1]. This can be done efficiently by using the range proofs from [Bou00, Lip01] . One can also use Pedersen's scheme, but this would result in more complicated arguments.
Quantum-Cryptographic RRT. We also present a quantum CRRT protocol (see Protocol 3) that allows for a value p ct that does not have to be a rational number, and which provides a relaxed form of information-theoretic security to both parties. While not secure by our previous definitions, it provides meaningfully low bounds on the probabilities of success for a cheater. Namely, (a) if dishonest, R cannot make his vote count as more than √ 2 votes: if
(we also show a slightly better bound with a more complicated expression for p adv , cf. Appendix B). (b) if dishonest strategy allows I to learn t with probability p ct + ε, it also leads to I being caught cheating with probability at least 2pct−1 2 ε. This form of security (informationtheoretic security with relaxed definitions) is common for quantum protocols for tasks like bit commitment [ATVY00] or coin flipping [Amb01, SR02] . The security guarantees of our quantum protocol compare quite well to ones achieved for those tasks. A desirable property of this quantum protocol is that it can be implemented by using contemporary technology, since it only involves transmitting and measuring single qubits, and no maintaining of coherent multi-qubit states.
To show the main ideas behind quantum protocol, we now show how to analyze a simplified version of protocol 3. The security proof for the full protocol is quite complicates and is given in appendix B. We also refer to appendix B for definitions of quantum states and operations on them.
The simplified version of Protocol 3 is:
1. I chooses a random u ← R [0, 1], prepares a quantum bit in the state |ψ u = √ p ct |u + √ 1 − p ct |1 − u and sends it to R. 2. R performs a bit flip if her type t = 1, and sends the quantum bit back to I. 3. I measures the state in the computational basis |0 , |1 , gets answer s. The answer is r = u ⊕ s.
If both parties are honest, the state returned by respondent is unchanged:
Measuring this state gives the correct answer with probability 1 − p ct . Next, we show that respondent is unable to misuse this protocol.
Theorem 1. For any respondent's strategy R
* , the probability of honest interviewer I getting r = 1 is between 1 − p ct and p ct . Therefore, the previous protocol is both correct and privacy-preserving for the interviewer.
Proof. We show that the probability of r = 1 is at most p ct . The other direction is similar. We first modify the (simplified) protocol by making R * to measure the state and send the measured result to I, this does not change the result of the honest protocol since the measurement remains the same. Also, any cheating strategy for R * in the original protocol can be used in the new protocol as well. So, it is sufficient to bound the probability of r = 1 in the new protocol. Now, the answer is r = 1 if I sent |ψ i and R * sends back j, with i = j. Thus, we have the setting of Fact 1 (see Appendix B.1). The rest is a calculation: to determine the angle β between |ψ 0 and |ψ 1 , it suffices to determine the inner product which is sin β = 2 p ct (1 − p ct ). Therefore, cos β = 1 − sin 2 β = 2p ct − 1 and
On the other hand, when using this simplified version, a dishonest interviewer I * can always learn t with probability 1. Namely, it suffices to send the state |0 . If t = 0, R sends |0 back unchanged. If t = 1, R applies a bit flip. The state becomes |1 . I can then distinguish |0 from |1 with certainty by a measurement in the computational basis. Note that this is similar to a classical "protocol", where I first generates a random u and sends a bit i that is equal to u with probability p ct and 1 − u with probability 1 − p ct . R then flips the bit if t = 1 and sends it back unchanged if t = 0. The interviewer XORs it with u, getting t with probability p ct and 1 − t with probability 1 − p ct . In this "protocol", R can never cheat. However, I
* can learn t with probability 1 by just remembering i and XORing the answer with i instead of u. In the classical world, this flaw is fatal because I cannot prove that he has generated i from the correct probability distribution and has not kept a copy of i for himself. In the quantum case, I can prove to R that he has correctly prepared the quantum state. Then, we get Protocol 3 with I sending two states |ψ u0 and |ψ u1 , one of which is verified and the other is used for transmitting t. (See Appendix B for detailed analysis of this protocol.)
Protocols for Other RRTs and Extensions
Protocol for Cryptographic RRT-IQ. Recall that in one version of RRT-IQ, the respondent would reply with his true opinion t R with a rational probability p ct = ℓ/n, while he would otherwise flip a coin and answer whether it came up tails. Like for CRRT-W, it is important to guarantee the use of correct distributions. Protocol 1 can be easily changed to work for this version of RRT-IQ. Instead of n random bits, R prepares 2n random bits µ i , so that µ i = n + ℓ if t R = 1, and µ i = n − ℓ if t R = 0. She also prepares a checksum bit µ 2n+1 = 1 − t R . The rest of the protocol is principally the same as in Protocol 1, with n changed to 2n, and R arguing that AKLin(y 1 , . . . , y 2n+1 ; 2ℓ; 2n − ℓ). , ℓ 1 , . . . , ℓ m ) + 1. The respondent prepares n numbers D µi , such that ♯{i : µ i = t R } = ℓ tR + ℓ, and ♯{i : µ i = j} = ℓ j , if j = t R . Then the interviewer and respondent will execute a variant of OT with choice σ, during which the interviewer only gets to know the value µ σ . Then the respondent argues that the sum of all commitments is a commitment to the value ℓ i D µi + ℓD j , for some j ∈ [1, m], by using range-proofs in exponents [LAN02] . (A more efficient proof methodology is available when D is a prime [LAN02] , given that one uses an integer commitment scheme.) Additionally, she argues that every single commitment corresponds to a value
Protocol for Cryptographic PRRT-BD.
, also using range-proofs of exponents [LAN02] . After the OT step, the interviewer gets g µσ , and recovers µ σ from it efficiently. (Note that m ≤ 10 is typical in the context of polling.)
Extensions to Hierarchies of Interviewers. One can consider a hierarchy of interviewers, reporting to some central authority. If there is a trust relationship between these two types of parties, no changes to our protocol would be required. However, if the central authority would like to be able to avoid having to trust interviewers, the following modifications could be performed. First, each respondent would have to authenticate the transcript he generates, whether with a standard signature scheme, a group signature scheme, etc. Second, and in order to prevent collusions between interviewers and respondents, the interviewers must not be allowed to know the choice σ made in a particular interview. Thus, the triple (A, B, C) normally generated by the interviewer during the Naor-Pinkas OT protocol would instead have to be generated by the central authority, and kept secret by the same. More efficient versions of proxy OT satisfying our other requirements are beneficial for this application [NP01a] . 
Proof (Sketch.). (a) Assume that R
* can guess σ with probability ε, given her view
). But then she can solve the DDH problem (given (g a , g b , g c ) for random a and b, decide whether c = ab or not) with probability ε:
she just computes such a σ, for which c = ab − σ + 1. After that, she only has to check whether σ = 1 or not.
(b) W.l.o.g., assume that σ = 1. Define ν[j] to be a vector, for which which 
* 's view consists of
s j ) for A, B and C chosen by himself. Since I * is unbounded, he can find the value of α = 0, and therefore he knows that (w j , y j ) = (g rj +asj , g µj+αB r j (C·g j−1 ) s j ). Since r j and s j are randomly chosen by a honest R, then the elements w j look completely random to I * , and do not help in guessing the value of µ j . He also cannot use any information in (w j , y j ), j = j, since these values do not depend on µ j .
Thus, to guess the value ν[j − 2 + b] j , he must find a bias in the value aB rj (Cg j−1 ) sj = αg brj +(ab+j−σ)sj mod q. Note that x := αg brj +(ab+j−σ)sj is a random element of Z * p due to the choice of r j and s j , unless b = ab + j − σ = 0. The latter will automatically hold if i = σ, but only with a negligible probability otherwise. Thus, we can assume that x is chosen randomly from Z * p . Guessing µ j ∈ Z m from y j is equivalent to guessing the value (x mod q) mod m. Denote e := ⌊q/m⌋. Since q | (p − 1) then x mod q is a random element of Z q , and ♯{x : x mod q mod m = j} ∈ e + c, where c ∈ {0, 1} is 1 iff j < d. Thus the best strategy of I * is to guess that x is equivalent to some element j < d, and equivalently, that ⊓ ⊔ Security in the left-or-right sense is both necessary and sufficient for our purposes. Namely, in the RRT-W protocol (Sect. 6), the interviewer I * knows that the input isup to the permutation of indices -one of the two values. For small n, the number of permutations is small, and thus with a high probability I * can guess that µ is one of the two, known for him, Boolean vectors. Without security in the left-or-right sense, he would be able to guess which of the two vectors is currently used, and thus to find the type of the respondent. On the other hand, if the oblivious transfer protocol is secure in the left-or-right sense, I
* cannot predict the Hamming weight w h (µ) = ♯{i : µ 1 = 1} of R's input.
B Detailed Quantum CRRT B.1 Background on Quantum Information
In this section, we describe the basic notions of quantum information needed to understand the quantum protocol and the analysis of its simplified version in section 6.
For a more detailed introduction to quantum information, we refer to book by Nielsen and Chuang [NC00] . A qubit is the basic unit of quantum information, similar to a bit in the conventional (classical) computing. A qubit has two basis states that are denoted by |0 and |1 . A general state of a qubit is α|0 + β|1 , with α, β being complex numbers with |α| 2 + |β| 2 = 1. We can perform two types of operations on quantum bits: unitary transformations and measurements. The simplest measurement of of a qubit α|0 + β|1 is in the computational basis that gives the result 0 with probability |α| 2 and 1 with probability |β| 2 . The state of the qubit then becomes |0 or |1 . Therefore, repeating the measurement gives the same outcome. As long as we only consider this one type of measurement, the state α|0 + β|1 behaves similarly to a probabilistic state that has been prepared as 0 with probability |α| 2 and 1 with probability |β| 2 . This analogy disappears, though, when we consider other transformations. A unitary transformation is a linear transformation on the two-dimensional space of all α|0 + β|1 that preserves the vector norm. Two examples of unitary transformations are the identity I(α|0 + β|1 ) = α|0 + β|1 and the bit flip X(α|0 + β|1 ) = α|1 + β|0 . A general von Neumann measurement on a qubit |Ψ is specified by two orthogonal vectors |Φ 0 and |Φ 1 . The outcome is either 0 or 1; the probability of outcome i is equal to the squared inner product of |Ψ and |Φ i . The state of the qubit becomes |Φ i . This measurement can be reduced to the measurement in the computational basis as follows. We take a unitary U that maps |Φ 0 to |0 and |Φ 1 to |1 . We apply U to the state |Ψ that we want to measure. Then, we measure the resulting state in the computational basis and apply U −1 .
Distinguishability. Assume someone prepares two states |Φ 0 and |Φ 1 , flips a fair coin i ← R [0, 1], and sends |Φ i it to us. We would like to guess i by measuring the state. We measure our success by the probability that our guess j ∈ {0, 1} coincides with i. If |Φ 0 and |Φ 1 are orthogonal, a von Neumann measurement in |Φ 0 , |Φ 1 basis tells i with certainty. For non-orthogonal states, no measurement gives i with certainty.
Fact 1 [NC00]
The maximum success probability with what we can distinguish |Φ 0 from |Φ 1 is 1 2 + sin β 2 , β being the angle between |Φ 0 and |Φ 1 . The above definitions are sufficient to understand the protocol and the analysis of simplified version in section 6. For the full security proof, more advanced notions like density matrices are needed, which are described in Sect. B.2.
B.2 Density Matrices
To prove the security of protocol 3, we need the more advanced formalism of density matrices. We interpret |ψ = α|0 + β|1 as a column vector (α, β)
T . Let ψ| denote a row vector (α * β * ), with * being the complex conjugation operator. Then, the density matrix of |ψ is
Next, assume that we generate a classical random variable that is i with probability p i and then prepare a quantum state |ψ i dependent on i. This creates a mixed quantum state. It can be also described by a density matrix ρ = i p i |ψ i ψ i |. If we measure a mixed state with a density matrix ρ in a basis |Φ 0 , |Φ 1 , the probability of getting outcome i is Φ i |ρ|Φ i (i.e., we multiply the density matrix with the row vector Φ i | on the left and the column vector |Φ i on the right and get a number which is the probability). The following is a counterpart of Fact 1 for mixed states.
Fact 2 [NC00]
The maximum success probability with which we can distinguish ρ 0 from ρ 1 is
, where A t is the trace norm of A (the trace (sum of diagonal entries) of matrix √ A ⊤ A).
B.3 Security Proofs for Protocol 3
Security against Malicious Interviewer.
Theorem 3. If a strategy for dishonest I * leads to being caught with probability at most ε, I
* can learn r correctly with probability at most p ct + 2 2pct−1 ε.
The security of this type (cheating is possible but not without risk of being detected) is common to many quantum protocols, for example quantum bit commitment [ATVY00] or coin flipping [SR02] . We note that our security guarantee is stronger than one achieved in [ATVY00] . Namely, in the bit commitment protocol of [ATVY00], a dishonest party can successfully cheat with probability ε so that the probability of being detected is just O(ε 2 ).
Proof (Theorem 3).
Assume that we are given a strategy for dishonest I * . First, notice that if we reverse the roles of |0 and |1 everywhere in this strategy, both the probability of passing the test and the probability of learning t correctly remain the same. Therefore, we can assume that the protocol is symmetric w.r.t. switching |0 and |1 .
Consider the state of the first quantum bit sent by I * . In the general case, I * can send probabilistic combinations of various quantum states. Therefore, the first quantum bit can be in a mixed state with some density matrix ρ = a α + βi α − βi b .
Proof (Lemma 2).
We assume that the second qubit has been prepared perfectly and its verification always succeeds. (If I * cheated in preparing the second qubit as well, this only decreases the probability of success for I * and the claim that we prove remains valid.)
After the test is passed on the second qubit, R has the first qubit in the mixed state ρ. The mixed state ρ is the same as one obtained by taking
|1 with probability 2α and |0 , |1 with probabilities 1 2 − α each. Therefore, the joint state of I * and R is equivalent to |ψ (R,I * ) = |1 ) R . Now, the question is how well can I * distinguish these two states. By Fact 1, the best probability with which he can get t is where β is the angle between the two states. cos β is equal to the inner product of |ψ (R,I * ) and |ψ ′ (R,I * ) which is 2α ( because the first two components of |ψ (R,I * ) are orthogonal to the first two components of |ψ Proof. There are four possible states that a responder can receive from an honest I: |ψ 0 |ψ 0 , |ψ 0 |ψ 1 , |ψ 1 |ψ 0 , |ψ 1 |ψ 1 . An honest responder then randomly requests to verify one of two quantum bits. A dishonest R * can measure the state and then decide to verify one of two bits based on the result of the measurement so that his chances of guessing the other state are maximized. Without loss of generality, R * 's measurement has two outcomes: 0 and 1 and the index i that is sent back to I is equal to the outcome of the measurement. Then, we have |ψ u0 ψ u1 = α u0u1 |0 |ψ Similarly to the simplified protocol in Sect. 6, the probability of R * fixing r = 0 (or r = 1) is equal to the probability that he correctly guesses u 1−i . We bound this probability. For brevity, assume that R * has requested u 1 from I and received u 1 = 0. Then, if u 0 = 0, his remaining state is |ψ Remember that, by analysis of Sect. 6, the probability of r = t in the honest case is described by similar expression p ct = 1 2 + sin β 2 where β is the angle between |ψ 0 and |ψ 1 . Next, we express β ′ by β. Remember that ψ|ψ ′ denotes the inner product between |ψ and |ψ ′ . The inner product ψ 0 |ψ 1 is equal to cos β. The inner product between |ψ 0 |ψ 0 and |ψ 1 |ψ 0 is the same cos β because the second qubit is in the same state in both cases. This inner product is also equal to 
